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Abstract. We present high probability diﬀerential trails on 2 and 3
rounds of BLAKE-32. Using the trails we are able to launch boomerang
attacks on up to 8 round-reduced keyed permutation of BLAKE-32.
Also, we show that boomerangs can be used as distinguishers for hash/
compression functions and present such distinguishers for the compres-
sion function of BLAKE-32 reduced to 7 rounds. Since our distinguishers
on up to 6 round-reduced keyed permutation of BLAKE-32 are practi-
cal (complexity of only 212 encryptions), we are able to ﬁnd boomerang
quartets on a PC.
Keywords: SHA-3 competition, hash function, BLAKE, boomerang at-
tack, cryptanalysis.
1 Introduction
The SHA-3 competition [6] will soon enter the third and ﬁnal phase, by selecting
5 out of 14 second round candidates. The hash function BLAKE [2] is among
these 14 candidates, and it is one of the few functions that has not been tweaked
from the initial submission in 2008. Being an addition-rotation-xor (ARX) de-
sign, BLAKE is one of the fastest functions on various platforms in software.
Indeed, among the fastest candidates, BLAKE has the highest published secu-
rity level, i.e. the best published attacks work only on a small fraction of the
total number of rounds. Few attacks, however, were published on the round-
reduced compression function and keyed permutation of BLAKE-32 (which has
10 rounds). In [3] Ji and Liangyu present collision and preimage attacks on 2.5
rounds of the compression function of BLAKE-32. Su et al. [7] give near collisions
on 4 rounds with a complexity of 221 compression function calls. However, one
can argue that the message modiﬁcation they use, requires an additional eﬀort
of 264 (see Sec. 5). Aumasson et al. in [1], among other, present near collisions
on 4 rounds of the compression function with 256 complexity, and impossible
diﬀerentials on 5 rounds of the keyed permutation.
Our Contribution. We show various boomerang distinguishers on round-
reduced BLAKE-32. Our analysis is based on the fact that BLAKE-32, be-
ing a keyed permutation, has some high probability diﬀerential trails on two
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and three rounds (2−1 on two and 2−7 on three rounds). Moreover, we can ex-
tend the three round trail to four rounds. First, we use these trails to build
boomerang distinguishers for the round-reduced keyed permutation of BLAKE-
32 on up to 8 rounds. Then we extend the concept of boomerang distinguishers
to hash functions. As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst application of the standard
boomerangs to hash function. An ampliﬁed boomerang attack applied to hash
functions was presented in [4], however it was used in addition to a collision at-
tack. Our boomerang attacks, on the other hand, are standalone distinguishers,
and work in the same way as for block ciphers – by producing the quartet of
plaintexts and ciphertexts (input chaining values and output chaining values).
We also show how to obtain simpler zero-sum distinguisher from the boomerang
and present such distinguishers for 4, 5, 6 rounds of BLAKE-32. Our ﬁnal re-
sult is a boomerang distinguisher for 7 rounds of the compression function of
BLAKE-32. The summary of our results is given in Table 1.
Although in this paper we focus on BLAKE-32, our attacks can be easily ex-
tended to the other versions of BLAKE (with similar complexities and number of
attacked rounds). The attacks do not contradict any security claims of BLAKE.
Table 1. Summary of the attacks on the compression function (CF) and the keyed
permutation (KP) of BLAKE-32
Attack CF/KP Rounds CF/KP calls Reference
Free-start collisions CF 2.5 2112 [3]
Near collisionsa CF 4 221 [7]
Near collisions CF 4 256 [1]
Impossible diﬀs. KP 5 - [1]
Boomerang dist. CF 4 267 Sec. 5
Boomerang dist. CF 5 271.2 Sec. 5
Boomerang dist. CF 6 2102 Sec. 5
Boomerang dist. CF 6.5 2184 Sec. 5
Boomerang dist. CF 7 2232 Sec. 5
Boomerang dist. KP 4 23 Sec. 6
Boomerang dist. KP 5 27.2 Sec. 6
Boomerang dist. KP 6 211.75 Sec. 6
Boomerang dist. KP 7 2122 Sec. 6
Boomerang dist. KP 8 2242 Sec. 6
a The attack assumes that message modiﬁcation can be used anywhere in the trail.
2 Description of BLAKE32
The compression function of BLAKE-32 processes a state of 16 32-bit words
represented as 4 × 4 matrix. Each word in BLAKE-32 has 32 bits. In the Ini-
tialization procedure, the state is loaded with a chaining value h0, . . . , h7, a salt
s0, . . . , s3, constants c0, . . . , c7, a counter t0, t1 as follows:
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⎛
⎜⎜⎝
v0 v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6 v7
v8 v9 v10 v11
v12 v13 v14 v15
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
h0 h1 h2 h3
h4 h5 h6 h7
s0 ⊕ c0 s1 ⊕ c1 s2 ⊕ c2 s3 ⊕ c3
t0 ⊕ c4 t0 ⊕ c5 t1 ⊕ c6 t1 ⊕ c7
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
After the Initialization, the compression function takes 16 message words
m0, . . . ,m15 as inputs and iterates 10 rounds. Each round is composed of eight
applications of G function. A column step:
G0(v0, v4, v8, v12), G1(v1, v5, v9, v13), G2(v2, v6, v10, v14), G3(v3, v7, v11, v15)
followed by the diagonal step:
G4(v0, v5, v10, v15), G5(v1, v6, v11, v12), G6(v2, v7, v8, v13), G7(v3, v4, v9, v14)
where Gi(i ∈ {0, . . . , 7}) depend on their indices, message words m0, . . . ,m15,
constants c0, . . . , c15 and round index r. At round r, Gi(a, b, c, d) is described
with following steps:
                      
161616 16
12 12 12 12
8 8 8 8
7 7 7 7
v[15]  v[11]  v[7]     v[3]       c[7]    m[6]               v[14]   v[10]  v[6]    v[2]         c[5]   m[4]              v[13]  v[9]    v[5]    v[1]        c[3]    m[2]               v[12]   v[8]    v[4]    v[0]        c[1]    m[0]
c[6]    m[7]                                                             c[4]   m[5]                                                               c[2]    m[3]                                                               c[0]    m[1]
Fig. 1. Column step of round-0
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1 : a ← a + b + (mσr(2i) ⊕ cσr(2i+1))
2 : d ← (d⊕ a) ≫ 16
3 : c ← c + d
4 : b ← (b ⊕ c) ≫ 12
5 : a ← a + b + (mσr(2i+1) ⊕ cσr(2i))
6 : d ← (d⊕ a) ≫ 8
7 : c ← c + d
8 : b ← (b ⊕ c) ≫ 7
where σr belongs to the set of permutations as speciﬁed in [2]. The Finalization
procedure in BLAKE-32 is depicted as:
h
′
0 ← h0 ⊕ s0 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v8
h
′
1 ← h1 ⊕ s1 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v9
h
′
2 ← h2 ⊕ s2 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v10
h
′
3 ← h3 ⊕ s3 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11
h
′
4 ← h4 ⊕ s0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v12
h
′
5 ← h5 ⊕ s1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v13
h
′
6 ← h6 ⊕ s2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v14
h
′
7 ← h7 ⊕ s3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v15
where h0, . . . , h7 is the initial chaining value and v0, . . . , v15 is the state value
after the ten rounds, and h′0, . . . , h
′
7 are the words of the new chaining value.
3 Boomerang Attacks on Block Ciphers and Compression
Functions
The boomerang attack [8] is a diﬀerential-type attack that exploits high proba-
bility diﬀerential trails in each half of a cipher E. When successful, it outputs a
quartet of plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts with some ﬁxed particular
diﬀerences between some of the pairs. This property can be used to distinguish
the cipher from a random permutation, and in some cases, to recover the key.
Let us decompose the initial cipher E into two ciphers E0, E1, i.e. E = E1◦E0.
Let Δ → Δ∗ be some diﬀerential trail for E0 that holds with probability p
and ∇ → ∇∗ be a trail for E1 with probability q. We start with a pair of
plaintexts (P1, P2) = (P1, P1 ⊕Δ) and produce a pair of corresponding cipher-
texts (C1, C2) = (E(P1), E(P2)). Then we produce a new pair of ciphertext
(C3, C4) = (C1⊕∇∗, C2⊕∇∗), decrypt this pair, and get the corresponding pair
of plaintexts (P3, P4) = (E−1(C3), E−1(C4)). The diﬀerence P3 ⊕ P4 is Δ with
probability at least p2q2: 1)the diﬀerence E0(P1)⊕E0(P2) is Δ∗ with probability
p; 2) the diﬀerences E−11 (C1)⊕ E−11 (C3), E−11 (C2)⊕ E−11 (C4) are both ∇ with
probability q2; 3)when 1), 2) hold, then the diﬀerence E−11 (C3)⊕E−11 (C4) is Δ∗
(with probability pq2) and E−1(C3)⊕ E−1(C4) is Δ with probability p2q2.
We would like to address a couple of issues. First, the boomerang distinguisher
can be used even in the case when it returns a pair (P3, P4) with a diﬀerence
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P3 ⊕ P4 speciﬁed only in certain bits (instead of the full plaintext). When the
diﬀerence is speciﬁed in t bits (t < n), then the probability of the boomerang (in
order to be used as a distinguisher) should be higher than 2−t, i.e. p2q2 > 2−t.
Second, the real probability of the boomerang is pˆ2qˆ2, where pˆ, qˆ are so-called
ampliﬁed probabilities, deﬁned as:
pˆ =
√∑
Δ∗
P [Δ → Δ∗]2, qˆ =
√∑
∇
P [∇ → ∇∗]2 (1)
Since ﬁnding these values is hard, in some cases, we try to get experimental
results for the probability of the boomerang. We run a computer simulation,
start the boomerang with a number of pairs with some preﬁxed diﬀerence Δ, and
count the number of returned pairs that have the same diﬀerence Δ. Obviously
the ratio of the returned pairs to the launched pairs is the probability of the
boomerang.
The main obstacle for applying the boomerang attack to compression func-
tions, is that in general, the compression functions are non-invertible. Hence,
after obtaining the pairs (C3, C4) from (C1, C2), one cannot go backwards and
obtain the pair (P3, P4). One way to deal with this is to switch to ampliﬁed
boomerang attacks [5]. However, this type of boomerangs usually has lower
probability, and more importantly, since it requires internal collisions, in the
case when the underlying compression functions are double pipes, the attack
complexity becomes higher than in a trivial attack.
Indeed, the standard boomerang attack can be used as a diﬀerential distin-
guisher for a compression function F . The idea is to start the attack in the middle
of F and then go forward and backwards to obtain the quartets, thus escaping
the feedforward. Let F (H) be obtained from some invertible function f(H) with
a feedforward, for example Davies-Meyer mode F (H) = f(H) ⊕ H . As in the
attack on block ciphers, ﬁrst step is to decompose f into two functions f0, f1 and
to ﬁnd two diﬀerential trails for f0 and f1 (further we use the same notation as
in the attacks on block ciphers). We start with four states S1, S2, S3, S4 at the
end of the function f0 (beginning of f1) such that S1 ⊕ S2 = S3 ⊕ S4 = Δ∗ and
S1 ⊕ S3 = S2 ⊕ S4 = ∇. From these states we obtain the initial states (input
chaining values) Pi and the ﬁnal states (output chaining values without the feed-
forward) Ci, i.e. Pi = f−10 (Si), Ci = f1(Si), i = 1, . . . , 4. Then with probability
at least p2q2 we have:
P1 ⊕ P2 = Δ, P3 ⊕ P4 = Δ
C1 ⊕ C3 = ∇∗, C2 ⊕ C4 = ∇∗.
Extending the following attack to the whole compression function F is trivial
– we just have to take into account that Ci = f(Pi) = F (Pi) ⊕ Pi. For the
boomerang quartet (P1, P2, P3, P4) we get:
P1 ⊕ P2 = Δ, P3 ⊕ P4 = Δ (2)
[F (P1)⊕ P1]⊕ [F (P3)⊕ P3] = ∇∗, [F (P2)⊕ P2]⊕ [F (P4)⊕ P4] = ∇∗ (3)
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For a random n-bit compression function F , the complexity of ﬁnding the quartet
(P1, P2, P3, P4) with the above relations (2),(3), is around1 2n . Hence when
p2q2 > 2−n one can launch a boomerang attack and thus obtain a distinguisher
for F . The distinguisher becomes even more powerful if the attacker ﬁnds several
boomerang quartets with the same diﬀerences Δ,∇∗.
A zero-sum distinguisher, can be obtained based on the boomerangs. If in (3),
we XOR the two equations, we get:
0 =[F (P1)⊕ P1]⊕ [F (P3)⊕ P3]⊕∇∗ ⊕ [F (P2)⊕ P2]⊕ [F (P4)⊕ P4]⊕∇∗ =
=F (P1)⊕ F (P2)⊕ F (P3)⊕ F (P4)⊕ (P1 ⊕ P2)⊕ (P3 ⊕ P4) =
=F (P1)⊕ F (P2)⊕ F (P3)⊕ F (P4)⊕Δ⊕Δ =
=F (P1)⊕ F (P2)⊕ F (P3)⊕ F (P4)
Finding a zero-sum distinguisher for a random permutation requires 2n/4 en-
cryptions. However, since we have the additional conditions on the plaintexts
(the XORs of the pairs are ﬁxed), the complexity rises to 2n/2.
It is important to notice that to produce the quartet (for the boomerang
or the zero-sum boomerang) one has to start not necessarily from the middle
states (S1, S2, S3, S4). For example, one can start from two input chaining values
(P1, P2) = (P1, P1 ⊕ Δ), produce the values (S1, S2) = (f0(P1), f0(P2)), then
obtain the values for the two other middle states (S3, S4) = (S1⊕∇, S2⊕∇), and
ﬁnally get the two input chaining values (P3, P4) = (f−10 (S3), f
−1
0 (S4)) and the
four output chaining values (f1(S1)⊕P1, f1(S2)⊕ P2, f1(S3)⊕P3, f1(S4)⊕P4).
Clearly, the probability of the boomerang stays the same. Starting from the
beginning (or from some other particular state before the feedforward) can be
beneﬁcial in the cases when one wants to use message modiﬁcation or wants to
have some speciﬁc values in one of the four states (as shown further in the case
of BLAKE-32).
4 Round-Reduced Diﬀerential Trails in BLAKE-32
In order to obtain good diﬀerential trails in BLAKE we exploit the structure
of the message word permutation. In fact we can easily obtain good 2-round
diﬀerential trail. The idea is to choose a message word mj such that
– It appears at Step 1(Case1 ) or at Step 5(Case2 ) in Gi(0 ≤ i ≤ 3) at round-r
and
– Also appears at Step 5 in Gi(4 ≤ i ≤ 7) at round-(r + 1).
If we choose the message word with the above mentioned strategy then with a
suitable input diﬀerence we may pass 1.5 rounds for free2 (i.e. with probability 1).
1 This holds only when the diﬀerence between the messages is ﬁxed as well. Otherwise,
the complexity is only 2n/2.
2 A similar technique was used in the analysis presented in [7,1].
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Observation 1. A 2-round diﬀerential trail can be obtained in BLAKE-32 with
probability 2−1.
Proof. Choose two rounds with a message word mj as described previously. In
– Case1, we choose Δmj = Δa = 0x80000000
– Case2, we choose Δmj = Δa = Δd = 0x80000000
in the corresponding G function (see Fig. 2). After 1.5 rounds we get Δvk =
0, ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , 15} with probability 1. In the next half of the second round
because of our choice of message word and suitable diﬀerence, we get one active
bit only at step 7 in the corresponding G function (see Fig. 3). Hence we get a
diﬀerential trail with probability 2−1.
Remark 1. In Case1 if Δmj and Δa have any active bits other than MSB then
at round-r, probability of the trail is 2−t(where t is the number of active bits
in Δmj(=Δa) at round-r) and at round-(r + 1) the probability is 2−s, where
s = 2t − 1, 2t, 2t + 1(depending on the position of active bits). So in this case
the probability for two rounds will be 1/2s+t. Also if mj appears at Step 1 in
Gi(4 ≤ i ≤ 7) at round-(r + 1) then probability of a 2-round diﬀerential trail
decreases further.
Remark 2. In Case1 if Δmj = Δa = Δ, such that Δ has two active bits at ith
and (i+16)th position and mj appears at step 1 in Gi(4 ≤ i ≤ 7) at round-(r+1)
then we have 2-round diﬀerential trail with probability 2−8−1(= 2−9) when ith
bit is the MSB and ≥ 2−12−2(= 2−14) otherwise.
In order to construct 3-round trails from these 2-round diﬀerential trails we
may simply add one more round at the beginning. The occurrence of the chosen
message word in this one round does not aﬀect much in terms of probability of
the diﬀerence propagation.
Observation 2. A 3-round diﬀerential trail may be obtained from the above
described two round diﬀerential trail with probability 2−s, where s = 6, 7 or 8
Proof. After obtaining 2-round diﬀerential trail with probability 2−1(Case1 ), we
add one more round(say, round-(r−1)) at the beginning. The probability of this
one round diﬀerential trail may vary depending on the position of the message
word mj . Suppose the message word occurs in Gl (for some index l) at round r.
Then at round r − 1:
– If the message word is in Gi(0 ≤ i ≤ 3) or at step 1 of Gi(4 ≤ i ≤ 7),
probability of this one round trail is 2−6.
– If the message word occurs at step 5 of Gl+4, we get diﬀerential trail with
probability 2−5 for this one round.
For all other cases the probability of this one round diﬀerential trail is 2−7. Hence
we get a 3-round diﬀerential trail with probability 2−7,2−6 and 2−8 respectively.
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Fig. 2. Two possible diﬀerential trails for G at the beginning of 2-round trail. The top
trail is Case1, while the bottom is Case2.
16
12
8
7
16
12
8
7
m
k
m
′
k
′
a
b
c
d
m
′
k
′
d
c
b
a
m
k
Fig. 3. Two possible diﬀerential trails for G at the end of 2-round trail. The top trail
is when the message with the diﬀerence appears at Step 1, and the bottom at Step 5.
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Remark 3. This 3-round diﬀerential trail can be extended for half more round
in the forward direction. If we add half round at the end of this three rounds
and if the chosen message word does not occur there then we can get 3.5-round
trail with probability ≥ 2−24−8(= 2−32).
For this three round diﬀerential trail we have to inject two distinct input diﬀer-
ences at v12 and v13 which correspond to the same counter t0. In order to obtain
a 3-round diﬀerential trail with consistent input diﬀerences at the states corre-
sponding to the counters t0 and t1 we use a 2-round trail with lower probability.
Observation 3. Let Δa = Δc = Δ such that Δ has only ith and (i+16)th bits
active. For a G function if there is no diﬀerence in the message words then the
diﬀerential trail (Δ, 0, Δ, 0)→ (Δ, 0, 0, 0) occurs with probability 2−3 if ith bit is
the MSB and with probability 2−6 otherwise.
Observation 4. A 3-round diﬀerential trail with input diﬀerence consistent
with counters(t0, t1) may be obtained with probability 2−21 or at least 2−36.
Proof. Starting with Δmj = Δa = Δ = 0x80008000 we obtain a 2-round dif-
ferential trail with probability 2−9(as described in Remark 2 ). Then we add
one more round at the beginning. The position of the message word mj in this
one round determines which three rounds we should consider in order to obtain
the 3-round trail. Such three rounds may be found if we start with round-4.
Now in this one round(added at the beginning) we have two G functions with
diﬀerences as described in Observation 3 and one G function with diﬀerence
(Δ1, Δ2, Δ, 0) → (0, 0, Δ, 0)(with the message diﬀerence at step 5 in it). So
probability for this one round is 2−6−6 = 2−12. Hence we get a 3-round trail
with probability 2−21. If Δ has two active bits (e.g. 0x00080008) then proba-
bility of this one round at the beginning may be at least 2−12−10 = 2−22 and
probability of the 2-round trail is at least 2−14. Hence we get 3-round diﬀerential
trail with probability at least 2−36.
The choice of message word for the 3-round diﬀerential trail speciﬁed in Obser-
vation 4 is available if we start with round-4 and the input diﬀerences for the
states corresponding to the counters are Δv12 = Δv13 = Δv14 = Δv15 = 0.
A similar 2-round and 3-round diﬀerential trails exist for BLAKE-64.
5 Boomerang Attacks on the Compression Function of
BLAKE-32
The high probability round-reduced diﬀerential trails in the permutation of
BLAKE-32 can be used to attack the compression function and ﬁnd boomerang
distinguishers. However, due to the Initialization procedure, there are a few re-
quirements on the trails. First, since the block index is copied twice, the initial
diﬀerences in v12 and v13, as well as the diﬀerences in v14 and v15, have to be
the same. Second, even in the case when the attacker has a trail with initial
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diﬀerences consistent to the above requirement, if he uses message modiﬁcation
techniques in the higher rounds of the trail, he might end up with inconsistent
initial states. For example, if the attacker uses some k-round trail and starts ﬁx-
ing the values of the state and the messages at round k, and then goes backward,
he can obtain two states with some predeﬁned diﬀerence (as the one predicted
by the trail). However, the probability that these two states are consistent with
the Initialization procedure is 2−64 (if v12⊕v13 = c4⊕c5 and v14⊕v15 = c6⊕c7).
Note that if one of the states is consistent, then the other one is consistent as well
(if the attacker used trails with appropriate initial diﬀerence). Therefore, using
message modiﬁcation techniques in later steps of the trail is not trivial (without
increasing the complexity of the attack). On the other hand, the modiﬁcation
can still be used at the beginning because the attacker starts with two states
consistent with the Initialization procedure.
For the boomerang attack on 4 rounds of the compression function of BLAKE-
32 we can use two trails each on 2 rounds (see Table 2). Since the probability
of these trails is only 2−1, the probability of the boomerang is 2−4. To create a
quartet of states, consistent with the Initialization procedure, we start with a
pair of states (P1, P2) that have a diﬀerence Δ (note that Δ does not have
a diﬀerence in the ”block index” words) and consistent with the Initialization
words v12, v13, v14, v15 in both of the states, then go two rounds forward and
obtain the pair (S1, S2). Then we produce the pair (S3, S4) = (S1 ⊕∇, S2 ⊕∇)
and go backwards two rounds to get the pair of initial states (P3, P4). The
probability that P3 (and therefore P4) is consistent with the Initialization is 2−64.
Also, from S1, S2, S3, S4 we go forward two rounds, produce the outputs and
apply the Finalization to get the new chaining values. Note that Finalization is
linear, hence the diﬀerential trail (with XOR diﬀerence) holds with probability 1.
Therefore, we can produce the boomerang quartet with a complexity of 4·24+64 =
270 calls to the 4-round reduced compression function of BLAKE-32.
The boomerang attack on 5 rounds is rather similar. We only need one of the
trails to be on 3 rounds, instead of 2 (see Table 3). Such a trail has a probability of
2−7, and we use two round trail with 2−3, hence the boomerang has a probability
of 2−2·3−2·7 = 2−20 and the whole attack (taking into account the Initialization)
has a complexity of around 4 · 220+64 = 286 compression function calls.
For the boomerang attack on 6 rounds we will use two 3-round trails (see
Table 4). However, we cannot use the optimal trails (the ones that hold with
around 2−7) because the starting diﬀerence in each such trail is inconsistent with
the Initialization procedure. Therefore, for the top trail of the boomerang we
will use a trail which has lower probability 2−34 but has no diﬀerences in any
of the ”block index” words (v12, v13, v14, v15). For the bottom trail we can use
an optimal trail. The complexity of this boomerang distinguisher on 6 rounds
becomes 4 · 22·34+2·7+64 = 2148 calls.
Note, for the top trails for 5 and 6 round boomerangs (see Table 3,4), we did
not use the best trails with probability 2−1, 2−21, but instead used trails with
lower probability (2−3, 2−34). We found that if we use the best trails, then the
boomerang does not work, most likely because of the slow diﬀusion. We cannot
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get four states in the middle (after the third round), that have pairwise Δ∗ and
∇ diﬀerence (Δ∗ is the end diﬀerence of the top trail). However, if we take other
trails, as the ones we have taken, the boomerang quartet can be obtained – we
conﬁrmed this experimentally, by producing a boomerang quartet.
Each of the above attacks can be improved if we take into account the am-
pliﬁed probabilities for the boomerang attack and if we use message modiﬁ-
cation. We can obtain the ampliﬁed probabilities (and the total probabilities)
of the boomerang experimentally: we start with a number of plaintext pairs
with the required diﬀerence Δ, and then check how many of the returned (by
the boomerang) diﬀerences are Δ. Also, in the ﬁrst round, for one side of the
boomerang we use message modiﬁcation, i.e. we pass this round with probability
1. Using these two approaches, we got the following results: the boomerang on 4
rounds has a probability 2−1, on 5 rounds 2−5.2, and on 6 rounds 2−36. Hence,
the attack complexity for 4 rounds drops to 4 · 21+64 = 267, for 5 rounds to
4 · 25.2+64 = 271.2, and for 6 rounds to 4 · 236+64 = 2102 compression function
calls. An example of boomerang quartet for 6 rounds, with the ﬁrst pair of plain-
text consistent to the Initialization, while only the diﬀerence in the second is
consistent, and therefore obtained with around 4 ·236 compression function calls,
is given in Table 9. The complexities of the boomerang distinguishers for 4,5,
and 6 round are bellow 2128, therefore they can be used as zero-sum boomerang
distinguishers, i.e. P1⊕P2 = P3⊕P4 = Δ and F (P1)⊕F (P2)⊕F (P3)⊕F (P4) = 0.
For the boomerang on 6.5 rounds, we use a top trail on 3 rounds (from 0.5
to 3.5) with 2−40, and a bottom trail on 3.5 rounds (from 3.5 to 7), with
2−48 (see Table 5). The complexity of producing the boomerang quartet is
4 · 22·40+2·48+64 = 2242 compression function calls. The probability of the ﬁrst
round in the top trail is 2−3, hence using message modiﬁcation does not lower
signiﬁcantly the attack complexity. However, computing the ampliﬁed probabil-
ities can improve the attack. Obviously, we cannot do this experimentally, as
the probability of the boomerang is too low – 2−2·40−2·48 = 2−176. Therefore,
we cannot test for the whole 6.5 rounds, but we can do it for a reduced number
of rounds. We tested for only half round at the end of the ﬁrst trail (round 3 to
round 3.5). We start with a pair of states with a diﬀerence speciﬁed by the top
trail at round 3 and go half round forward to obtain a new pair of states. Then,
to each element of the pair, we XOR the same diﬀerence (the one speciﬁed by
the bottom trail at round 3.5), and produce a new pair states. Finally, we go
backwards a half round, and check if the diﬀerence in the pair is at the one we
have started with. Note that the half round can be split into four G functions,
and for each of them the ampliﬁed probabilities can be found independently.
By doing so, we found that the ampliﬁed probability for this half round of the
boomerang is 2−26 instead of twice 2−33, i.e. 2−2·33 = 2−66. Another low proba-
bility part of the boomerang is the top half round of the second trail – round 3.5
to round 4 holds with 2−41. In this part we can use message modiﬁcation. We
start at round 3.5 with four states that have pairwise diﬀerences Δ∗ and ∇. We
go half round forward and obtain four states with pairwise diﬀerences as speci-
ﬁed by the bottom trail at round 4. To obtain such states we need 4 ·22·41 = 284.
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Once we have this half round boomerang, we can freely change the message
words that are not taken as inputs in this half round without altering the input
and the output values of the half round. Hence, we have 28·32 = 2256 degrees of
freedom. From the middle states we can obtain the initial and ﬁnal states (and
the chaining values). Therefore, the total complexity of the boomerang on 6.5
rounds becomes 284 +4 · 22·(3+1+3)+26+2·(6+1)+128 = 2184 calls. Note that unlike
as in the case of the boomerangs on 4 and 5 rounds, now the probability that
the initial states are consistent to the Initializationis 2−128 because we use mes-
sage modiﬁcation in the middle rather than in the beginning. The bottom trail
can easily be extended for additional half round (see Table 5) with probability
2−24. Therefore, the boomerang on 7 rounds requires around 2184+2·24 = 2232
compression function calls.
6 Boomerang Attacks on the Keyed Permutation of
BLAKE-32
Further we present boomerang attacks on the keyed permutation of BLAKE-32,
assuming that the key is unknown to the attacker. These attacks can be seen
as distinguishers for the internal cipher of BLAKE-32. The cipher takes 512-bit
plaintexts and 512-bit key, and after 10 rounds, outputs 512-bit ciphertext (we
discard the Initializationand Finalization procedures).
Switching from the boomerangs for the compression function to the boomerangs
for the keyed permutation has advantages and disadvantages for the attacker. On
one hand, the attacker is not concern any more about the Initialization proce-
dure, and he can use any trails for the boomerang. On the other hand, since the
key is unknown, he cannot use message modiﬁcation techniques to improve the
probability of the boomerang.
The boomerangs on 4 and 5 rounds of the keyed permutation of BLAKE-
32 have the same probability as in the case of compression function: 2−4 for 4
rounds, and 2−20 for 5 rounds. For 6 rounds, we can use two high probability
trails (2−7, 2−7, see Table 6), and therefore, the probability of the boomerang is
2−28. If we take into account the ampliﬁed probabilities, and ﬁx the returning
diﬀerence only in 128 bits (the words v1, v5, v9, v13) instead of in 512 bits, for the
total complexity of the boomerang attack we get 23 encryptions for 4 rounds,
27.2 for 5 rounds, and 211.75 for 6 rounds. These results were conﬁrmed on a PC
and a boomerang quartet for 6 rounds is presented in Table 8.
The boomerangs for 7 and 8 rounds, are rather similar: for 7 rounds we use
two trails on 3.5 rounds (the ﬁrst from round 2 to round 5.5, and the second from
round 5.5 to round 9), and for 8 rounds, we just extend these trails for additional
half round (see Table 7). The complexity of the boomerangs is 4·22·31+2·52 = 2168
for 7 rounds and 4 · 22·73+2·82 = 2312 for 8 rounds. Again, as in the case of 6.5-
round boomerang on the compression function, we can compute experimentally
the lower bounds on the ampliﬁed probabilities, by testing only the probability
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of the ﬁrst half round of the bottom trail. We get 2−48 instead of 2−2·44. Also,
we can ﬁx the returning diﬀerence only in 256 bits, instead of 512 bits, and thus
increase the probability in the ﬁrst half round of the top trail by a factor of 2−6
for 7 rounds, and 2−30 for 8 rounds. Hence, the boomerang on 7 rounds requires
at most 2122, and on 8 rounds at most 2242 encryptions.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how to apply the concept of boomerang distinguisher
to compression functions, and presented such distinguishers for the compression
function of BLAKE-32, as well as classical boomerang distinguishers for the
keyed permutation of BLAKE-32. Our attacks work on up to 2/3 of the total
number of rounds of the compression function, and on up to 4/5 (the attacks
on up to 3/5 have practical complexity) of the total number of rounds of the
keyed permutation of BLAKE-32. The attacks can be equally well applied to the
other versions of BLAKE. Our attacks do not contradict the security claims of
BLAKE.
Interestingly, tweaking the message permutation in BLAKE can reduce the
number of attacked rounds only by one. Therefore, either tweaks in the function
G or more advanced message expansion is required in order to signiﬁcantly reduce
the number of attacked rounds.
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A Diﬀerential Trails for the Boomerangs
Table 2. Diﬀerential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 4 rounds of BLAKE-32.
On the left is the top trail, while on the right is the bottom trail of the boomerang.
ΔM is the message diﬀerence, while ΔVi are the diﬀerences in the state. In the left
trail (top trail), ΔV0 is the starting diﬀerence of the trail, i.e. ΔV0 = Δ, and ΔV2 is the
ending diﬀerence, i.e. ΔV2 = Δ
∗. In the right trail (bottom trail), ΔV2 is the starting
diﬀerence of the trail, i.e. ΔV2 = ∇, and ΔV4 is the ending diﬀerence, i.e. ΔV4 = ∇∗.
The numbers 0,1,2, and 2,3,4, indicate the rounds covered by the boomerang – the top
trail starts at round 0 and ends after round 1, while the bottom trail starts at round
2 and ends after round 3.
Δm Δm
00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
R. ΔVi R. ΔVi
0 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 2 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1 1
1 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−1 2−1
2 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 4 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000
00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000 00010000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000
00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00000000
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Table 3. Diﬀerential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 5 rounds of BLAKE-32
Δm Δm
00000000 00000000 40000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
R. ΔVi R. ΔVi
0 00000000 40000000 00000000 00000000 2 00000800 80008000 80000000 80000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000800 80008000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 80808080 80000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00800080 80008000 80000000
2−1 2−6
1 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−2 1
2 00000000 40000000 00000000 00000000 4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00008000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00400000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00400000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−1
5 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000
00010000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00800000 00000000
Table 4. Diﬀerential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 6 rounds of CF of
BLAKE-32
Δm Δm
00080008 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
R. ΔVi R. ΔVi
4 80088008 00000000 00080008 00000000 7 80008000 00000000 00000000 00000800
80088008 00000000 00000000 00000000 80008000 00000000 00000000 80000800
00080008 00000000 00080008 00000000 80808080 80000000 00000000 80000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800080 00008000 00000000 80000000
2−21 2−6
5 00000000 00000000 00080008 00000000 8 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−2 1
6 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 9 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−11 2−1
7 00880088 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 11011101 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00000000 80088008 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000
00000000 00000000 00000000 80008000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
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Table 5. Diﬀerential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 6.5 and 7 rounds of CF
of BLAKE-32
Δm Δm
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
80008000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
R. ΔVi R. ΔVi
0.5 00000000 80008000 00000000 00000000 3.5 00800880 c8088848 80440044 00008000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 80800880 488c0888 80040804
00000000 00000000 00000000 80008000 00000800 00008080 80808080 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80048040 08408840 00800000 80000000
2−3 2−41
1 00000000 80008000 00000000 00000000 4 80000000 00000000 80000800 80008000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000800 80008000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 80000000 80808080
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80008000 00000000 80000000 00800080
2−1 2−6
2 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 5 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−3 1
3 00000000 00000000 00000000 80008000 6 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00010001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00800080 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00800080 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−33 2−1
3.5 00010001 08000800 08000800 80088008 7 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
02000200 10111011 11111111 11101110 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000
00010001 00880088 80888088 88008800 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00080008 80088008 08000800 00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000
2−24
7.5 00000800 08000000 80000008 00110010
10010010 01101001 10110101 22222022
00800008 80080080 08808080 11001101
00000008 80080000 08800080 11001100
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Table 6. Diﬀerential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 6 rounds of KP of
BLAKE-32
Δm Δm
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
R. ΔVi R. ΔVi
0 80008000 80000000 80000000 00000800 3 80008000 00000000 00000000 00000800
80008000 00000000 00000000 80000800 80008000 00000000 00000000 80000800
80808080 80000000 00000000 80000000 80808080 00000000 00000000 80000000
00800080 80008000 00000000 80000000 00800080 00000000 00000000 80000000
2−6 2−6
1 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 4 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1 1
2 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 5 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−1 2−1
3 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 6 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00010000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00001000 00000000
00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000
00000000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
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Table 7. Diﬀerential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 7 and 8 rounds of KP of
BLAKE-32
Δm Δm
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
R. ΔVi R. ΔVi
1.5 80440044 00008000 80800880 48088848 5.5 80808000 80888080 c80c8008 80440044
488c0888 00040804 80000000 80800880 80040804 80800000 80888000 c8880088
80808080 80000000 00000880 00008080 80000000 00000800 00808080 80000080
00800000 80000000 00040040 88c00840 00800000 00048000 08408840 80800000
2−42 2−44
2 00000800 80008000 80000000 80000000 6 00008000 80000000 00000000 80000800
80000800 80008000 00000000 00000000 80008000 00000000 00000000 00000800
80000000 80808080 80000000 00000000 00808080 80000000 00000000 00000080
80000000 00800080 80008000 80000000 80808080 80008000 00000000 80800000
2−6 2−7
3 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 7 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1 1
4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 8 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−1 2−1
5 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 9 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00010000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000
00000000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−24 2−30
5.5 00110010 00000800 08000000 80000008 9.5 08000000 80000008 80110018 00000800
22222022 10010010 01101001 10110101 01101001 10110101 32332123 10010010
11001101 00800008 80080080 08808080 80080080 08808080 19809181 00800008
11001100 00000008 80080000 08800080 80080000 08800080 19801180 00000008
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B Examples of Boomerang quartets
Table 8. Example of a boomerang quartet for 6 round-reduced keyed permutation of
BLAKE-32
P1 7d8a1f02 206849ad 42413a50 d702fa14 facc9c67 11306e7c eba852eb 4f31f62f
993e3958 bc426fcc 55033261 b2ac26a9 6dfc2edd 32163c44 ef989577 2d6d6bb4
P2 fd8a9f02 a06849ad c2413a50 d702f214 7acc1c67 11306e7c eba852eb cf31fe2f
19beb9d8 3c426fcc 55033261 32ac26a9 6d7c2e5d b216bc44 ef989577 ad6d6bb4
P3 de971194 ae012c6a 4422f8ea fff2d41b 80a79b50 b1d61b36 fe8c23fe a883faf9
e1dab487 e4971af1 51dbf40b 6e32fb27 7c797796 19b156e9 16e0ac52 a12eefcb
P4 5e979194 2e012c6a c422f8ea fff2dc1b 00a71b50 b1d61b36 fe8c23fe 2883f2f9
615a3407 64971af1 51dbf40b ee32fb27 7cf97716 99b1d6e9 16e0ac52 212eefcb
P1 ⊕ P2 80008000 80000000 80000000 00000800 80008000 00000000 00000000 80000800
80808080 80000000 00000000 80000000 00800080 80008000 00000000 80000000
P3 ⊕ P4 80008000 80000000 80000000 00000800 80008000 00000000 00000000 80000800
80808080 80000000 00000000 80000000 00800080 80008000 00000000 80000000
M1 a0a28e67 1fd77849 83d86d19 4a72bc82 3704f04d bb57c994 37612239 0f7ad68a
df14386d 4e2e05c7 55d1a87f 187d8225 fcc527c5 96071c3e 4ae251d8 52de23f2
M2 a0a28e67 1fd77849 83d86d19 4a72bc82 b704f04d bb57c994 37612239 0f7ad68a
df14386d 4e2e05c7 55d1a87f 187d8225 fcc527c5 96071c3e 4ae251d8 52de23f2
M3 a0a28e67 1fd77849 83d86d19 4a72bc82 3704f04d 3b57c994 37612239 0f7ad68a
df14386d 4e2e05c7 55d1a87f 187d8225 fcc527c5 96071c3e 4ae251d8 52de23f2
M4 a0a28e67 1fd77849 83d86d19 4a72bc82 b704f04d 3b57c994 37612239 0f7ad68a
df14386d 4e2e05c7 55d1a87f 187d8225 fcc527c5 96071c3e 4ae251d8 52de23f2
M1 ⊕M2 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
M1 ⊕M3 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
M2 ⊕M4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
C1 928c1f77 3aa097f2 4d5589bb f307e618 c8ea4ebc c63769df 64e2b7ba f2c76b2b
c909808a 672bcdf3 260608d6 7de7ba36 749c4e7d aef2defd b7d3318a 5080389e
C2 9948791c 21c19a0f 8804efac d56588e4 c6f6b101 32456224 20c423d5 df0105fe
33ee8883 23bde21d bedb2451 2c673c2f bf7d194d cfc78321 5ec259f9 a9c8786b
C3 928c1f77 baa097f2 4d5589bb f307e618 c8ea4ebc c63769df 64e3b7ba f2c76b2b
c909808a 672bcdf3 260608d6 7d67ba36 741c4e7d aef2defd b7d3318a 5080389e
C4 9948791c a1c19a0f 8804efac d56588e4 c6f6b101 32456224 20c523d5 df0105fe
33ee8883 23bde21d bedb2451 2ce73c2f bffd194d cfc78321 5ec259f9 a9c8786b
C1 ⊕ C3 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
C2 ⊕ C4 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
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Table 9. Example of a boomerang quartet for 6 round-reduced compression function
of BLAKE-32. Note that the initial states P1, P2 are consistent with the Initialization.
P1 30841585 41abc330 447466d0 17ae8472 b94fc56d e9cb678a 1d9d6e9e eb558123
66d322c2 23cbae19 52e9bb2a dd6b8f2b ea1cd197 678ad865 6594bdd4 81f42bc5
P2 b08c958d 41abc330 447c66d8 17ae8472 39474565 e9cb678a 1d9d6e9e eb558123
66db22ca 23cbae19 52e1bb22 dd6b8f2b ea1cd197 678ad865 6594bdd4 81f42bc5
P3 f3383666 710fc071 1990f347 34475dd7 7d41ddc9 68e231ed ea9bba79 a4990860
d7ede8b5 f1c0b054 1c754989 a0e95ceb 3d259f5f 878bffae f511b0fd def26a26
P4 7330b66e 710fc071 1998f34f 34475dd7 fd495dc1 68e231ed ea9bba79 a4990860
d7e5e8bd f1c0b054 1c7d4981 a0e95ceb 3d259f5f 878bffae f511b0fd def26a26
P1 ⊕ P2 80088008 00000000 00080008 00000000 80088008 00000000 00000000 00000000
00080008 00000000 00080008 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
P3 ⊕ P4 80088008 00000000 00080008 00000000 80088008 00000000 00000000 00000000
00080008 00000000 00080008 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
M1 7670ae70 c6539713 373c66b6 3d4522c3 b66689d0 37ee4f5d 467de620 9aabd357
b6b3b13c c6d41a4c cb994b4c b79e16fa 8a9d8079 9914ccb1 9c68b051 86d41e1e
M2 7678ae78 c6539713 373c66b6 3d4522c3 b66689d0 37ee4f5d 467de620 9aabd357
b6b3b13c c6d41a4c cb994b4c b79e16fa 8a9d8079 9914ccb1 9c68b051 86d41e1e
M3 7670ae70 c6539713 373c66b6 3d4522c3 b66689d0 37ee4f5d 467de620 9aabd357
b6b3b13c c6d41a4c cb994b4c b79e16fa 8a9d8079 9914ccb1 1c68b051 86d41e1e
M4 7678ae78 c6539713 373c66b6 3d4522c3 b66689d0 37ee4f5d 467de620 9aabd357
b6b3b13c c6d41a4c cb994b4c b79e16fa 8a9d8079 9914ccb1 1c68b051 86d41e1e
M1 ⊕M2 00080008 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
M1 ⊕M3 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
M2 ⊕M4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
C1 3f432ef6 5f89fb80 7283d8cf 13731945 344d16f8 2203b3b5 74b3637e 52ed9169
efcea8db 32b84ffc 57cfa772 2258156c 22696ef4 53cb7ac6 3ab6294a ce58038c
C2 f284e034 f866e60d 1e52775f f6f764cb ef09e2e8 da83b2d1 a4a869d1 f22eefb0
821c38c2 6da245e0 7b52665c 0f8ce3ba 7ed4c20c ef76217d 77835c6d 184a17e3
C3 3f432ef6 df89fb80 7283d8cf 13731945 344d16f8 2203b3b5 74b2637e 52ed9169
efcea8db 32b84ffc 57cfa772 22d8156c 22e96ef4 53cb7ac6 3ab6294a ce58038c
C4 f284e034 7866e60d 1e52775f f6f764cb ef09e2e8 da83b2d1 a4a969d1 f22eefb0
821c38c2 6da245e0 7b52665c 0f0ce3ba 7e54c20c ef76217d 77835c6d 184a17e3
C1 ⊕ C3 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
C2 ⊕ C4 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
